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Abstract: The paper presents a stepwise procedure to develop a fault tolerant
control system for small satellites. The procedure is illustrated through imple-
mentation on the AAUSAT-II spacecraft. As it is shown the presented procedure
requires expertise from several disciplines that are nevertheless necessary for
obtaining a complete and consistent solution.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Design of a complete fault tolerant supervisory
control involves a number of activities. It requires
methods that can help the designers to rigorously
analyze the system, identify all possible/potential
faults, identify the monitoring/diagnosis possibil-
ities, design control and sensor fusion algorithms
for different scenarios, design the dedicated deci-
sion logic to ensure correct decision when an event
has occurred and then take the appropriate action
to accommodate for the situation.
In this paper we proposed a stepwise procedure
that has been employed in order to design the
Fault-tolerant supervisory control for the student
satellite AAUSAT-II. Due to the space constraint
we limit ourselves to provide the main ideas and
introduce the methods in brief in order to illus-
trate their applicability with help of some exam-
ples related to the AAUSAT-II control system.
1 The authors would like to acknowledge work done by
students working on the AAUSAT-II ADCS.
The paper include the following sections. In sec-
tion 2 the AAUSAT-II is shortly introduced. Sec-
tion 3 presents the architecture for fault tolerant
control implementation. The structural analysis
method in section 5 provides information on ex-
isting redundant information in the system that is
useful for fault diagnosis as well as fault accommo-
dation purposes. Fault accommodation strategies
are discussed in section 6. The fault diagnosis
topic, where the results of structural analysis are
used, is discussed in section 7. In section 8 we
discuss the fault handling methods. Then we in-
troduce a method for designing the supervisor’s
decision logic in section 9.
2. AAUSAT-II DESCRIPTION
The AAUSAT-II is the second CubeSat from
AAU made by students only. The CubeSat is
characterized by being 100mm on each side of the
cube and weighting 1000 g. AAUSAT II carries
two science experiments, an Advanced Attitude
Determination and Control System (ADCS) and
a Gamma Ray Burst Detector.
2.1 Actuators and Sensors
The actuators used on the AAUSAT-II are three
magnetorquers and three momentum wheels mounted
perpendicular to each other and aligned to the
three axes of the spacecraft frame. The momen-
tum wheel is a small circular flywheel mounted on
the drive shaft of a small DC-motor and can be
used to change the attitude of the spacecraft due
to the preservation of angular momentum. The
magnetorquers are square coils attached to three
of the sides of the spacecraft, perpendicular to
each other, and exert a torque on the spacecraft by
interacting with the magnetic field of the Earth,
which makes them beneficial to use in LEO. In
order to control the attitude with the actuators
it is necessary to be able to determine the actual
attitude and angular velocity. These tasks will be
accomplished by combining four kinds of sensors;
one tri-axis magnetometer, six gyroscopes, six sun
sensors and eight temperature sensors
3. FAULT-TOLERANT CONTROL SYSTEM
ARCHITECTURE
As it is illustrated in figure 1 a modular archi-
tecture for implementation of the fault tolerant
control system is employed. The detector modules
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Fig. 1. An overview of fault tolerant control sys-
tem architecture.
monitor the system and when a fault occurs the
supervisor is informed. Based on the received in-
formation from detector modules and/or operator,
the supervisor switches to appropriate state. The
effector modules translate the new state and carry
out the necessary changes (including changing
the control strategy or activating proper sensor
fusion). The modularity provides both flexibility
when changes are needed and also less compli-
cated testing procedures.
As shown on Figure 1, the spacecraft could be
considered as a complex system with different
sensors, actuators and controllers. Due to the
system complexity as described previously it is
necessary to apply a structured way of analysing
the system in steps, as shown in figure 2 from
(Bøgh, 1997).
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Fig. 2. Systematic fault tolerant control system
development approach.
In the following we describe a stepwise procedure
that is used to analyze the ADCS system with the
aim of designing a fault tolerant control system
for the AAUSAT-II satellite that operates in a
correct and consistent manner. Different steps of
this procedure are described in the sequel.
4. FAULT MODELING AND HAZARD
ANALYSIS
A natural and important step in the analysis
phase concerns identifying and assessing possible
faults with the aim of achieving tolerance towards
the most crucial ones at control system level. This
step constitutes following sub-steps:
4.1 Fault modeling
This step involves dividing the system into compo-
nents and analyzing each component for possible
faults using a proper Hazard analysis technique.
For electro-mechanical systems the Failure Mode
and Effect Analysis (FMEA) technique is been
used (International, 1998). The result of FMEA
on the magnetorquer is shown in table 1.
4.2 Fault assessment
This step includes fault propagation analysis
through the system levels, severity assessment for
each fault, and causal relation analysis. The result
would be a set of identified severe faults that
require detection and handling.
Fault assessment is performed by using a Severity
Occurrence (SO) index. Each fault is assessed
Table 1. FMEA for the magnetortquers.
Magnetorquers
Produces a magnetic field to align with Earth’s field
Ref. Failure Effect Failure Cause
MT1 Low magnetic
field
a) Broken wire / b) Bad
soldering
Component burned
MT2 Maximum mag-
netic field power
Shortcut to the power volt-
age
MT3 Wrong direction
of the magnetic
field
a) Misalignment of the
magnetorquer caused by
launch shock or wrong
mounting
b) Shortcut of some parts
of the torquer to the power
voltage
MT4 Wrong power
of the magnetic
field
Floating supply voltage
caused by broken wire or
bad soldering
with respect to severity and occurrence. The
severity describes the level of impact that an
occurrence of a fault has on the mission objective
(here the control objective) and quantized with
numbers from 1 to 10 where 10 is the highest
rated i.e. severity 10 is very severe. The occurrence
represents the probability that a fault will occur
during the mission’s lifetime and is quantized by
numbers ranging from 10 (very likely) to 1 (highly
improbable) (International, 1998).
The Severity Occurrence Index (SO) is then ob-
tained through multiplication of the severity and
occurrence values. The faults in the sensors or
actuators with the highest SO Index should be
considered in the design process. The SO index
table for the magnetorquer is presented below.
Table 2. SO index table for the magne-
tortquer.
Magnetorquer
Reference Severity Occurrence SO Index
MT1 7
a 5 35
b 4 28
MT2 10 − 3 30
MT3 3
a 2 6
b 1 3
MT4 4 − 6 24
4.3 Fault simulation and injection
The faults in the SO index tables are evaluated by
means of either simulation or fault injection on the
actual system. Since our system is a satellite, fault
injection on the real system is for large number
of faults is not a realistic option. Hence, faults
are modeled and simulated on a computer model
and evaluated through studying their effect on
the control objectives. Figure 3 shows the effect
of a winding break in the x-axis magnetorquer
at t=100s, which unhandled would result in a
diverging attitude relative to the desired.
Fig. 3. Fault injection example. The top figure
shows how the satellite attitude evolves and
the bottom figure shows how the attitude
diverges from the non-faulty attitude.
5. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
A general framework for an analysis of diagnostic
feasibility and possibility is the structural ap-
proach (Declerck and Staroswiecki, 1991; Izadi-
Zamanabadi and Staroswiecki, 2000; Blanke et
al., 2003). The main objective of the structural ap-
proach is to identify the parts/ subsystems in the
plant that contain redundant information. The
redundant information can then be analyzed and
used for diagnosing faults by using appropriate
methods. The structure model of a system does
not depend on detailed knowledge of parameters
or dynamic relations within the plant, only rela-
tion between the constraints (i.e. diff. equations,
algebraic eqs., rules) and the variables are con-
sidered. It shall be noticed that the analysis is
performed on the complete nominal system (with
no fault). In addition, the structural analysis is
used to identify the sensor fusion possibilities in
the system, which then is employed to accommo-
date for different faulty sensors. The structural
analysis method will be partially illustrated in
the following (For more information please consult
(Izadi-Zamanabadi, 2002). The dynamic and kine-
matics of the satellite is described by the following
equations:
[
ω˙
q˙
]
=
[
I−1Next +Nctrl − S(ω)(Iω + hmw)
1
2
Ω · q
]
[
ωm
qm
]
=
[
13×3 03×4
04×3 14×4
] [
ω
q
]
Where ω is the angular velocity vector, q is the
quaternion vector, hmw is the impulse of the
momentum wheels, Next is the external torques,
i.e. disturbances and Nctrl is the net control
torque from the magnetorquers and the momen-
tum wheels; Nctrl =Nmt −Nmw.
To illustrate the method we focus on the equations
given by parts of the kinematics and measure-
ments. Looking at the first row of the differential
equation describing the kinematics we get:
q˙1 =
1
2
(ω3.q2 − ω2.q3 + ω1.q4)
In structural analysis formulation this equation is
represented by a constraint of following form:
c1(q˙1, ω3, q2, ω2, q3, ω1, q4) = 0,
Correspondingly, other constraints are define:
c2 (q1, q˙2, q3, q4, ω1, ω2, ω3) = 0
c3 (q1, q2, q˙3, q4, ω1, ω2, ω3) = 0
c4 (q1, q2, q3, q˙4, ω1, ω2, ω3) = 0
In addition, differential constraints are introduced
to indicate the differential terms in the equations
(see (Blanke et al., 2003) for more details):
d1(q˙1, q1) = 0, d2(q˙2, q2) = 0,
d3(q˙3, q3) = 0, d4(q˙4, q4) = 0
The measurements are represented by the follow-
ing constraints:
c5(q1m, q1) = 0, c6(q2m, q2) = 0,
c7(q3m, q3) = 0, c8(q4m, q4) = 0,
c9(ω1m, ω1) = 0, c10(ω2m, ω2) = 0,
c11(ω3m, ω3) = 0
The structural model is obtained by establishing
all constraints in the system. The structural model
is then represented by a directed graph, which
illustrates the link between different variables and
constraints. It will also provide a straight way
to calculate the unknown variables from known
variables through the involved constraints. For in-
stance, the following figure depicts the mentioned
constraints where the gyroscopes’ measurements
are involved. The redundant information in the
system is then identified by means of matching.
For instance, ω1 is matched to c9 and indicated
by ω1 ↔ c9, which means that the value of ω1 can
be calculated through c9 when the other involved
variables, here ω1m, are known. Since we have 15
constraints and 11 unknown variables, we can at
most obtain 11 matched pairs, as illustrated in
table 3:
Table 3. Possible match for gyroscope
system
c5 ↔ q1 c6 ↔ q2 c7 ↔ q3 c8 ↔ q4
c9 ↔ ω1 c10 ↔ ω2 c11 ↔ ω3 d1 ↔ q˙1
d2 ↔ q˙2 d3 ↔ q˙3 d4 ↔ q˙4
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Fig. 4. A structural digraph
The resulting 4 unmatched constraints, i.e. c1 −
−c4, represent redundant information in the sys-
tem and can be used for fault detection as well as
fault accommodation purposes.
6. FAULT ACCOMMODATION STRATEGIES
In this step the strategies to handle different
selected faults will be handled where for every
operational mode, the required subsystems and
instrumentations are evaluated w.r.t. possible re-
dundancies in order to maintain the operation. In
addition, critical time requirements for handling
the faults in order to avoid loss of control ob-
jectives are also established in this step. For the
sensor faults, the fault accommodation strategy is
heavily based on the sensor fusion possibilities and
uses the redundant information that is provided
by structural analysis. The actuator faults are
mostly handled through control reconfiguration or
hardware redundancy.
The mentioned steps provide a comprehensive
method for analysis a system with the aim of
achieving fault tolerant. The final outcome of this
phase is a list of severe faults that need to be
detected and handled and a clear view of the
means by which they should be handled.
The next phase is the detailed phase where the
aim is to materialize the detection and handling
activities in a coherent and consistent manner.
This phase consist of three steps: developing al-
gorithms to detect identified faults, Developing
decision logic that react to the possible fault (or
commands) and determine a corresponding logi-
cal state, and finally, algorithms/procedures that
interpret the new state and provide the required
corresponding functionality.
7. FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION
Depending on the HW/SW redundancies and the
complexity of the underlying system dynamics
there exist various methods and algorithms for
fault diagnosis purposes.
Fault detection and isolation could benefit from
the SA by utilizing redundant information, pro-
vided by SA, and employing model-based methods
such as observer-based or parity space methods.
To illustrate the idea, we would like to generate a
residual that illustrated a fault in the gyro mea-
suring ω1. Using direct method we can establish
a residual signal (as an indicator for faults) as
follows:
r1 = ω1m · q4m − 2 ·
dq1m
dt
+ ω3m · q2m − ω2m · q3m
It should be noted that in order to obtain suffi-
ciently good estimate it can be necessary to filter
the measurements. This subject is out of the scope
of this paper and will not be considered further.
By manipulating all redundant information in the
system through development of dedicated Fault
diagnosis algorithms, the possibility of detecting
and isolating all chosen severe faults is then eval-
uated.
If all faults can be detected and isolated, then
the next step will be initiated. Otherwise, the
development group has to find a negotiated so-
lution between adding additional instrumentation
or compromise to a lower level of FTC require-
ments. In the case where we add additional instru-
mentations (sensors), previous steps of analysis
phase must be repeated.
8. FAULT HANDLING AND
ACCOMMODATION
Two cases have been of interest: faults in sen-
sors and faults in actuators. In the sensor case
fault handling is achieved either through software
or hardware redundancy. For Pico-satellites, as
AAUSAT-II, the possibility of using HW redun-
dancy is very limited, hence software redundancy
is the preferred one. The use of SA results becomes
again very beneficial as it is illustrated by the
following example: Assume that a fault in the
gyro that provides measurement ω1m is faulty. We
can calculate/estimate the value of ω1 through
the unmatched constraint c1 (c2, c3, c4 can also be
used):
ωˆ1 =
2 · dq1m
dt
− ω3m · q2m + ω2m · q3m
q4m
As mentioned in the previous section, the numer-
ical problems can be handled by introducing ap-
propriate (low-, band-pass) filters. The most prob-
able solution in case of actuator failures is either
HW redundancy or control reconfiguration. For
AAUSAT-II case the pointing mode is achieved
either by using both magnetorquers and momen-
tum wheels (indicated by a submode called Fine
Pointing (Fine) mode) or magnetorquers only (in-
dicated by a submode called Eco Pointing (Eco)
mode). The Eco mode provides a lesser degree of
pointing accuracy; In case of failure in momentum
wheels, the Eco mode, with its dedicated control
algorithm, will be activated.
All fault handling and accommodation strategies
are activated by effector modules in figure 2
depending on the current state of the supervisor’s
decision logic.
9. DECISION LOGIC
The process starts will defining the mission ob-
jectives and the set of mission modes in which
different the mission objectives can be achieved.
For instance, the mode ”pointing” is defined for
the case where we would like to initiate the scien-
tific tasks of the mission. For each mission mode,
different control modes can be defined. These con-
trol modes reflect the set of instrumentation (sen-
sors/actuators and control algorithms) by which
the objectives for the mission phase are achieved
albeit degraded performance.
Figure 5 illustrates the conceptual arrangement
of the modes (operation/control) based on which
the decision logic is constructed. The priority of
the modes are illustrated in the figure as well.
For instance, if the control objective in the ”Fine”
mode cease to be reachable then the control mode
will change to the less demanding mode (in this
case the ”Eco” mode), If no control mode is left
then the mission mode will be changed to the less
demanding mission mode, etc.. Thus if everything
fails the system will finally reach idle mode where
the ADCS will stop all control actions and merely
return house keeping information from available
sensors.
Operational
mode
Idle
Detumbling
Pointing Fine
Eco
Sensors
controller
Actuators
1
2
3
Detum
Sensors
controller
Actuators
1
2
3
Sensors
controller
Actuators
1
2
3
Control
mode
P
e
ri
o
ri
ty

L
o
w

H
ig
h

Fig. 5. A graphical representation of the different
modes in the decision logic.
As mentioned before each control mode involves a
combinations of sensors, actuators and controller
(algorithms) to fulfill the given control objectives
in that mode. Decision on which combination
of these should be used depends on the Health
Condition, HC, of the involved components. The
boolean valued health condition will be provided
by dedicated fault diagnosis modules, i.e. ifHCx is
true then the component x is fault free otherwise
it is false. A boolean string for each feasible trans-
ducer combination can now be made for an appro-
priate controller (algorithm). To maintain clarity
and overview, similar transducers can be grouped
together since they are often used together, i.e.
magnetometers.
Through design and simulation the (sub)set of
actuators needed for achieving control objectives
with various degree of performance need to be de-
termined. For instance, analysis and simulations
show that the Detum controller still can meet the
control objectives with one magnetorquer failing.
In addition, some sensors, when failed, can be
replaced through sensor fusion measures which
uses the Structural analysis results (as described
in the previous section).
An example of generating boolean strings which
will satisfy the control objectives in Detum modes,
albeit with varying performance is given below.
(a) HCmt1 ∧ HCmt2 ∧ HCmt3
(b) HCmt1 ∧ HCmt2
(c) HCmt1 ∧ HCmt3
(d) HCmt2 ∧ HCmt3
Since it is likely that more than one string would
results in true the strings are prioritized through
the “≻“ operator, which, for the above example,
gives
Smt = (a) ≻ ((b) ∨ (c) ∨ (d))
Which is to be read as: Take (a) whenever pos-
sible. If not possible then take either (b), (c) or
(d) (notice that they can not be true at the same
time).
Now the building of a mode in the supervisor is
done by combining sets of transducers and activat-
ing the associated controller. For the detumbling
controller, Detum, case it would look like the
following:
Detum = S∗mt ∧ (S
∗
B ∨ S
∗
G)
Where the “∗” denotes the string of choice from
the set of strings, thus the Detum is to be read
as: Detumbling mode is possible if at least two
magnetorquers are working and either the magne-
tometers, SB, or the rate gyros, SG are working.
In the same manner, we set up the mission modes:
Mission = Pointing ≻ Detumbling ≻ Idle
where
Pointing = Fine ≻ Eco
The Supervisor complexity is then reduced to a
test of a boolean expression to make sure that the
wanted mode can be fulfilled and then to pass the
logic construction string to the appointed effector.
Note: The introduced logic design method pro-
vides a completely autonomous switching between
different mission as well as control modes. The
operator interference (in form of commands) in
the logic will be facilitate by simply introducing a
logic value that facilitates a forced switch between
modes. For instance, the mission can be redefined
to
Mission= (Pointing ∧ OPPoint) ≻
(Detumbling ∧ OPDetum) ≻ Idle
Hence, if the operator wishes to switch from the
Pointing mode to Idle mode he can set the values
of OPPoint and OPDetum to false and force the
ADCS system to operate in the Idle mode.
10. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have provided a stepwise proce-
dure for analysis and design of a fault-tolerant su-
pervisory control system for small satellites. Car-
rying through different steps requires tools/methods
from various disciplines such as Hazard analy-
sis, modeling and control, etc. Our attempt has
focused on using methods that can be carried
through preferably by using automatic software
tools in order to minimize the human generated
errors in the design. Based on our experience,
we expect that the presented procedure facilitates
a time efficient solution for developing a FTC
supervisory system.
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